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Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 23
Defendant Class Actions
The problems posed to the Court and litigants under Class Action Rule 23 appear to be endless and increasingly complex ....We have from each side in this
case on this issue alone a stack of briefs and other materials approximately nine
inches in height. If we were to decide the question solely by the weight of the
material submitted, we would have to give the decision to the defendants
because they have contributed more to this stack of papers than has plaintiff
.... Despite the-deceptive simplicity of the laudable purposes of Rule 23, the
result has been a serious drag upon judicial functions.'
Surely it is a rare judge who cannot empathize with the frustrations which led
Judge Knox, in Stavrides v. Mellon Bank, N.A.,2 to conclude that while the
originally perceived function of class action rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may have been "praiseworthy," its application may intimate that "in
some respects the cure is worse than the disease." 3 It is by now a cliche to assert
that the class action device is viewed with considerable suspicion by courts, 4 and
recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle 8'Jacquelin
have gone far to insure that the frequency of class action suits will be diminished.
In light of this trend it may appear paradoxical that one of the most complex, and potentially profitable, varieties of class action suits, the defendant
class action, is apparently becoming increasingly common. 6 Quite frequently,
such suits involve two classes'-both plaintiff and defendant-and thus the
'Stavrides v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 69 F.R.D. 424, 425-26 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The case involves a conventional plaintiff class action.
269 F.R.D. 424 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
3Id. at 426.
4
A recent judicial discussion of the problems involved in class actions is Becker, The Class
Action Conflict: A 1976 Report, 75 F.R.D. 167 (1977). Judge Becker authored the opinion in the
famous defendant class case Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F.
1968).
Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill.
5417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen imposes a stringent requirement that "individual notice be sent
to all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort." Id. at 177.
'The absence of detailed statistics makes it difficult to verify this intuitive conclusion. A
comparison of early commentary with more recent observations may, however, provide some support for this assessment. Compare Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23,
46 COLUM. L. REv. 818, 827 n.43 (1946), where the author determines that defendant classes are
only "rarely" approved as of 1946, with the recent determination that "[m]any defendants' classes
actions, and in criminal justice, housing, and sex
have been certified in civil rights class
discrimination class actions, as well as other types of class litigation." 1 NEwBERG ON CLASs AcTioNS § 1148b, at 252 (1977).
'See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974) (class certification denied on appeal); Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976), affd, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398 (W.D. Mich. 1976); and Yanez v. Jones, 361 F.
Supp. 701 (D. Utah 1973).
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issues involved in assessing "representativeness," "commonality," and the other
by-ways of Rule 23 become doubly laborious for the courts. The judicial
response to the "new"9 phenomenon of claims against defendant classes has
nevertheless been tolerant. 10 While the most ambitious instances of the defendant class suit have met with reprimand, as in Kline v. Coldwell, Banker &
Co., 1 where one judge half-seriously remarked that defendant class certification
should be "conditioned upon an agreement by counsel that they will pay all costs
of all defendants if the suit is lost,"1 2 a more accommodating judicial response is
evident in cases such as United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. III.13 In that
action, the court acknowledged little difficulty in certifying a defendant class
even though it conceded there was no precedent which "appears so ambitious as
14
this one.."
The facts of the Trucking Employers case are simply stated. Black and
Spanish-surnamed employees brought suit under Title VI1 5 against a nationwide class of defendant trucking employers,' 6 alleging discriminatory employment policies and practices within the industry. The plaintiffs sought injunctions
against several hundred firms located throughout the United States, and
damages in the form of back pay for individuals allegedly injured by members of
the defendant class.
One of the important issues raised by the case was whether the court
must obtain personal jurisdiction over all members of the defendant class
before a binding decree could be entered.1 7 This note analyzes the precedents
and policy considerations which should inform a judicial response to this
question. Ultimately the conclusion reached here is very similar to the result
in Trucking Employers I, II: A requirement of in personam jurisdiction over
all members of a defendant class would in many instances deprive the class
action device of much of its utility 8 or produce anomalous and inequitable
results. The more important conclusion of this note, however, is that no
3See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9As the discussion in the text accompanying note 23 indicates, the concept of the defendant
class is not a new one, although application of the FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provision for defendant classes is

a relatively modern phenomenon.
"See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Dawes, 370 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Neb. 1974); Research Corp.

v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969); and United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969).

"508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974).
"Id. at 237 (concurring opinion).
1375 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977). Other aspects of the case are discussed in United States v.
Trucking Employers I, 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976), and United States v. Trucking Employers II,
72 F.R.D. 101 (D.D.C. 1976). The three opinions discuss overlapping procedural issues of
jurisdiction and certification prior to the commencement of trial.
1475 F.R.D. 682, 686 (D.D.C. 1977).
"42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.
"The class was defined so as to include only common carriers of general commodity freight
by motor vehicle that employed over-the-road drivers, were parties to or were bound by a national master freight agreement and area supplements thereto, employed at least 100 persons,
and had
annual gross revenue of at least $1,000,000. Id. at 682.
17United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976).
"See United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. III, 75 F.R.D. 682. (D.D.C. 1977).
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analysis of the personal jurisdiction question should end with this vague invocation of the wonder-working economies of class actions. Rather, courts
certifying defendant class actions in the absence of complete personal jurisdiction should be aware that they are seeking a compromise and that such a
compromise requires that members of a defendant class be afforded special
protections. In particular, it is urged that constitutional due process requires
notice to absent members in the case of a defendant class. The Trucking Employers court implicitly arrives at this conclusion. In that case, the
named party representatives signed a partial consent decree with the plaintiffs
prior to the commencement of the class action litigation. Absent class
members later challenged the ability and desire of those named defendants to
adequately represent all the defendants' interests. While the court analyzed
the problem within the familiar rubric of "adequacy of representation,' 9 the
court also recognized that in the defendant class context, no assurance of
adequate representation is a complete substitute for the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard:
The Court has also directed that nonparty defendants be served with papers
of general significance to the case at various times during the pendency of
the case, to ensure that those nonparty defendants would have the opportunity to bring to the Court's attention any instance in which they felt their interests diverged from those of the named defendants. 20
The court is in essence defining a class of defendants who are neither
parties nor absent class members according to the common usages of those
terms. Perhaps it should not be surprising that a court adjudicating a defendant class action should find itself fashioning new procedural law. Although
Rule 23 expressly provides for actions against a defendant class, 2 this aspect
of the rule has only recently been explored, and there is a scarcity of legal
literature on the subject. 22 The concept of the defendant class is, however,
"United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., II and III, 72 F.R.D. 101, 105-07 (D.D.C.
1976) and 75 F.R.D. 682, 687-91 (D.D.C. 1977).
2072 F.R.D. 101, 106 (D.D.C. 1976).

21

"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf

of all ....
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
"iThis is also the conclusion reached in 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1148, at 249
(1977). That treatise includes a useful recent survey of the issues involved in defendant class actions. Discussions are also found in 1 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1770 (1972) and in 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1977). Early discussions of defendant
classes are Note, Action Under the Codes Against Representative Defendants, 36 HARV. L. REV.
89 (1922); and Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REv.
818, 827-29 (1946).

More recently, the defendant class action is analyzed in Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91
HARV. L. REv. 630 (1978); Note, FederalRules of Civil Procedure23: A Defendant Class Action
with a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. L. REV. 357 (1975); Anderson and
Roper, Limiting Relitigation by Defendant Class Actions from Defendant's Viewppint, 4J.

I. PRAC.

MAR.

& PROC. 200 (1971); and Note, Damages in Class Actions; Determination and Allocation, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 615, 619-21 (1969).
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much older then the federal rules; indeed, it may be that the defendant class
was once more prevalent than its familiar plaintiff class counterpart: "The
earliest class actions, or bills of peace in nature of class actions, brought in
English chancery court of the 17th and 18th centuries, were largely defendants' class actions in which the plaintiff needed to join numerous parties
defendant in order to receive an effective remedy. '23 Of course, the initial
impetus of the class action device was that it provided "an escape from and
24
an adjustment to the rule of joinder."
The modem defendant class action is found in a variety of substantive
contexts. Although commentators contradictorily conclude that the defendant
class is most typically employed in civil rights cases2 5 and in actions against
unincorporated associations, such as labor unions, 26 there is general agreement that the device is most often employed with the ultimate aim of injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to a "numerous class of defendants who
27
are engaged in similar practices."
Having said this, it is evident, as the Trucking Employers court and others
have recognized, that the court cannot practicably allow defendant class actions wherever it is merely alleged that a putative class of defendants have
engaged in "similar practices." The potential threat to judicial economy and
the due process rights of defendants is clear; less obvious is the danger that
massive actions involving both plaintiff and defendant classes will erode an important distinction between the judicial and administrative processes.2" Little
reflection is necessary to perceive the Pandora's box of adjudicative evils lurking in a rule which allows one class of litigants to sue another class. In Kline,
for example, a transaction between two parties almost burgeoned into litigation between 400,000 sellers seeking $750 million in damages from 2,000
jointly and severally liable defendants.2 9
A rigorious application of Rule 23 may eliminate many inappropriate
cases, and to some observers these protections may appear adequate.30
Whether properly or not, however, a plentitude of federal courts have placed
3

" NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1148, at 250 (1977).

24

REV.

3B MOORES FEDERAL PRACTICE 123.02[1], at 23-72 (1977).
25Note, Damages in Class Actions: Determinationand Allocation 10 B.C. INDUS. & COm. L.
615, 619 (1969).
287

WRIGHT & MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1770, at 659 (1972).
§ 1148, at 251 (1977).

211 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

28This point is interestingly discussed in LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d
461, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1973).
: 9Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1974).
It should be emphasized, however, that the drafters of Rule 23 appear to have inadequately considered the problems of defendant classes. This criticism of the rule prior to the 1966
amendments is advanced in Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 818, 827, and is reiterated with respect to the present rule in 5 NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 9 715g, at 1420 (1977). See generally Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B.A.J. 837 (1977), which provides an analysis of provisions of the Uniform Class Action Act which
would modify the treatment of defendant classes.
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more fundamental limitations, generally arising out of constitutioral con31
straints, upon defendant class actions. If such extra-procedural limitations
exist, it is important that they be defined, if only to avoid extracting double
service from a procedural rule which was never a paragon of draftsmanship.
It seems axiomatic that the more functions a procedural rule must serve, the
less likely it is that any will be served well.
Jurisdiction over the person is one of the most important of the judiciallycited constraints. The concensus is that defendant class actions should be administered no differently in this regard than their plaintiff class counterparts.
That is, personal jurisdiction requirements need only be observed with respect
2
to the class representatives. 3 But as the Trucking Employers court and others
have perceived, such a rule does not fully address many of the subtle problems
encountered in a defedant class action. Moreover, the issue is far from settled
in light of conflicting Supreme Court precedents on whether jurisdiction must
33
be met with respect to all members of a defendant class. The answer to this
question should begin with a consideration of the policies of venue and service of process.
While personal jurisdiction is generally distinguished from the formal requirement of venue and service of process, 3 4 the evolution of personal
jurisdiction from a strict geographic constraint to the more vague notion of
"fundamental fairness"35 may make reliance on such distinctions misleading.
As a practical matter, the "mere prerequisites" of venue and service of process may often be dispositive of questions of fundamental fairness, and hence
it may be somewhat inaccurate to speak of them as separate requirements
apart from jurisdiction over the person.

THE POLICIES OF VENUE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS As APPLIED TO
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
Venue
Venue is an important element of protection for a defendant in any
litigation. Venue requirements generally insure convenience of personal ap31See Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938) (personal jurisdiction); LaMar v. H.
& B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973) (case or controversy: standing); Weiner v.

Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (case or controversy: standing).
327 WRIGHT & MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1757, at 566 (1972);
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1355h, at 492 (1977).
3

1

" Compare Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938) with the opinions in Hartford
Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.

356 (1921).
344 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1063, at 203 (1969).
35

Traditionally, notions of personal jurisdiction have been based on defendant's presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular court.... [T]he current philosophy is
that a defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum so that the maintenance of

a suit against him in that locale does not offend traditional notions of "fair play and
substantial justice."
Id. at 203-04, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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pearance and serve to limit the plantiff's choice of available forums.3 6 When
applied in the defendant class context, however, venue statutes may achieve
an anomalous result which is the opposite of the intended protection; as the
limitations of a venue statute become more restrictive, it becomes easier for
the plaintiff to select the representative defendant party by bringing the action within his district. The resulting opportunity for duplicitous conduct may
be easy to correct where extreme. Courts may find the problem more difficult
to perceive and resolve, however, when a plaintiff employs venue requirements to avoid the strongest defendant representative. Certainly nothing
in the federal rules suggests that the representative -defendant must be the
most capable member of the defendant class;3 7 yet to allow a plaintiff to gain
even this advantage is an obvious perversion of venue statute objectives. A
similar problem would arise where venue requirements were so stringently applied as to defeat the logical class definitions of the federal rules; 38 a plaintiff
who sought to limit a defendant class to unmotivated or financially secure
defendants could do so by his choice of courts.3 9
Federal courts have been inconsistent in their application of venue
statutes to defendant class actions. In Appleton Electric Co. v. AdvanceUnited Exressways,40 counsel appointed to represent the absent members of the
defendant class argued that some of the absent defendant corporations did
not possess the requisite "minimal contacts" with the Northern District of
Illinois.41 The court's response was that the relevant statute4 2 established the
1"'The principles of federal venue have been designed to insure that litigation is lodged in a
convenient forum and to protect the defendant against the possibility that plaintiff will select an
arbitrary place in which to bring suit." 4
CIVIL § 1063, at 203 (1969).

WRIGHT & MILLER. FEDERAL PRAarICE

& PROCEDURE:

"Rule 25 requires only that a representative party will "fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Many of the problems discussed here are also
raised in determining whether the plaintiff has chosen an adequate representative for the defendant class. See the discussion at note 73, infra.
"See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

"The ease with which this could be accomplished is evident when one considers that a
great many defendant class suits involve plaintiff classes as well. In such a case, a great many
jurisdictions would likely be available to the plaintiffs as forums for the litigation. The possibility
that the plaintiff would choose financially secure defendants may produce an inequitable result
where defendants are made jointly and severally liable. While it may be argued that this inequity
is simply a function of the substantive law, it would be an unusual situation indeed where defen-

dant class actions were legislatively anticipated. See generally Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.,
508 F.2d 226, 235 (9th Cir. 1974).
40494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
41Id. at 139. The court's action in appointing representative counsel for absent class members
is interesting. In Trucking Employers III, non-representative parties repeatedly urged that their interests were not adequately represented before the court by the named defendants. The court held

that the named defendants did not have to raise all of the procedural defenses of all absent members.
75 F.R.D. 682, 587-88 (D.D.C. 1977). A recent Supreme Court case holds that the representative
party lacks standing to assert procedural defenses not relevant to his own situation. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380-81 n.6 (1978). This leaves absent class members in the uncomfortable
position of having to rely on later collateral attacks to assert procedural defenses.
4249 U.S.C. § 16(4).
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trial court as a proper place of venue, and in dictim it supported the conclusion reached in Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc.,4 8 that

"venue need not be established as to those non-representative-party class
members, since to do so would eliminate the use of the class action route in
all cases where a defendant class is appropriate." 44 More recently, this position has been endorsed in Trucking Employers I, which avowed that the class
action device is the "outstanding exception" to the rule that an in personam
judgment will not be binding unless an individual is made a party through
service of process. 45 The court held that "lack of proper venue as to such absent class members does not impair the Court's ability to entertain the action
46
and adjudicate the rights and liabilites of those absent class members."
While the Appleton and Trucking Employers I opinions considerably
muddle what distinctions may be made between venue, service of process,
and personal jurisdiction, their answer to the venue question is clear; since a
non-representative party need not appear before the court, the convenience
considerations embodied in venue statutes are irrelevant.
A very different position is advanced in Sperberg v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. 4 7 In that case the court considered not only whether it is meaningful to apply venue statues to absent members of a defendant class, but also
whether courts are empowered to ignore those requirements if they choose.
The court concluded that ignoring the venue statute would be "contrary to
the mandate of Congress in Sec. 1400(b), contrary to Rule 82, Fed. R. Civ.
P., and contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Schnell . . . and
49
Snyder . .... ," Snyder v. Harris
underscored the jurisdictional limitation

expressed in Rule 82,50 refusing to allow the aggregation of claims in a plain4301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969).

41Id. at 501. While the court undoubtedly was aware of the exaggeration in its assertion

that defendant class actions would be thwarted in "all" appropriate cases, its pronouncement
should by no means be dismissed as mere hyperbole. The suit involved allegations of patent infringement, and objections to defendant class membership have always been especially strong in
patent cases due to the highly restrictive patent venue statute. Concurring with this conclusion of
Research Corp. is Dale Elecs., Inc., v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 538 (D.N.H. 1971).
See generally Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating Patents?
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474.
4572 F.R.D. 98, 99-100 (D.D.C. 1976).
41Id. at 100.
4761 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
41Id. at 73, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the potent venue statute: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business."
The court also drew support from Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q.
552, 552 (D. Md. 1970), where the court concluded it is "highly questionable that Rule 23 was
intended to cross-out the specific venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1400(b).
...
61 F.R.D. 70, 73
(H.D. Ohio 1973). Another case, In Re Yam Processing, 175 U.S.P.Q. 645 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
labeled the question as being "far from settled." Id. at 647. n.5.
4394 U.S. 332 (1969).
10Id. at 341. "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
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tiff class action to meet federal venue diversity requirements. The Snyder
court held that only causes of action which had historically permitted the aggregation of these claims would be permitted to do so in the future.51
The response to this argument by the Trucking Employers I court was
that "[s]ettled law has long been that class suits may be maintained without
the personal appearance of class members."52 The court relied upon Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble5s to reach this conclusion. While the Sperberg
opinion may seem to be a more mechanical, less policy-oriented conclusion
than the one in Trucking Employers I, there may at least be a certain
wisdom in its apparent humility. An absolute requirement that venue must be
shown for all members of a defendant class eliminates the danger that venue
statutes may be used by a plaintiff to define the class boundaries or to select a
vulnerable class representative. On the other hand, the Sperberg approach
would also eliminate many legitimate class actions. The Trucking Employers
I court offers the reasonable alternative of applying venue requirements only
to the representative parties if the court determines that some other device will
protect the rights of absent defendants. Extensive notice to such nonparty
defendants and an opportunity to be heard individually may provide the
needed safeguards.
Service of Process
While both venue and service of process are inextricably bound to the notions of fairness which underlie in personam jurisdiction, it does not, of
course, follow that the requirements of one may be ignored if the requirements of the other are met. Thus, while the court in JuniorSpice, Inc. v.
Turbotville Dress, Inc."4 found valid service of process under a long-arm
statute, the court emphasized that it would be an "untenable fiction" to conclude that the statute created "constructive residency" within the state for
venue purposes. 55
An examination of existing precedent suggests that there is somewhat
more agreement that requirements for service of process, as opposed to venue
limitations, need be satisfied only with respect to class representatives.5 6 It aps1394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969). The question in Snyder was raised because the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the previous "true" and "spurious" class
action forms. The line between "true" and "spurious," tenuous as it may have been, also formed
the distinction for whether claims could be aggregated to meet the $10,000 diversity requirement.
Id. at 355.
1272 F.R.D. 98, 100 (D.D.C. 1976). The implicit argument of the court, of course, is that
it is not the federal rules, but case law prior to the passage of jurisdictional statutes, which
creates the class action exception to jurisdiction.
$3255 U.S. 356, 363-64, 366 (1921).
54339 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
55
d. at 1192.
5
- See 7 WRIGHT & MILLR, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1757 at 566 (1972); 1
NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS 1355h, at 492 (1977); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255
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pears, however, that judicial justifications in this context are often no more
enlightening than in the case of venue requirements. Thus, Management
Television Systems, Inc. v. National Football League57 responded to a due
process objection to absence of service by relying on precedent. The court
determined that service on the representative is sufficient for suing an associa58
tion via the class action device.
Consideration of the arguments with respect to service of process requires,
as in the case of venue, that the specific policies at issue be considered in the
defendant class context. At an elementary level, successful service of process is
a means to show expeditiously that a party has adequate notice of a claim
against him. At the same time, service of process represents a means of
tempering a court's jurisdiction by imposing geographical limitations on the
exercise of its power. Combined with venue, service of process is a method of
protecting the defendant from the plaintiff's initial advantage. It may be that,
such limitations provide no protections which could not be supplied by
judicial supervision; it is likely, however, that venue and service of process are
a more economical means to that end.
The significance of judicial economy as a policy basis for service of process may pose a dilemma in the context of defendant class actions, since
economy is also an important rationale for the class action device. One may
reasonably consider whether there is a net gain when service of process requirements are ignored to make way for the class action. At the same time,
the loss of these safeguards by a defendant class may involve risks not evident
to the same extent in the more typical plaintiff class action. One must question the conclusion of the Trucking Employers I opinion that "[t]he fact that
• . .the class is a defendant class does not suggest a different result," even
though the court is certainly correct to state that "[ain absent plaintiff choosing to appear personally is no more likely to be in a proper venue district
than an absent defendant."5 9 While there may be no mandate for a different
result, a heightened concern for the peculiar dangers encountered by a defendant class seems warranted.
While it may be argued that such dangers are wholly speculative, cases
such as Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C.L. Electronics, Inc. 60 at least suggest the
kind of subtle abuses that may occur when the policies of venue and service
of process are wholly ignored. The court in Dale certified a defendant class of
only thirteen members because "[i]n the instant case, with the exception of
U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921) (plaintiff class); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494
F.2d 126, 139 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendant class); Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 259 (5th Cir.
1962) (defendant class); and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 148
F.2d 403. 406 (4th Cir. 1945) (defendant class).
:752

55

F.R.D. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1971).

1d. at 164. The court relies on Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and

Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945).
:972 F.R.D. 98, 100 n.* (D.D.C. 1976).
6053 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971).
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Sprague which does business in New Hampshire, the locations of the defendants range from California . . . to Nebraska. Joinder is not only imprac-

ticable, but impossible."16 1 The "impossibility" of joinder here is apparently a
function of venue requirements and/or an inability to satisfy service of process through a long arm statute. 62 Certification in such a case is a clear
subversion of the class action principle; the facts of Dale suggest a forum
which is more convenient to the plaintiff than to the defendant class. One
can only speculate as to how suitable R.C.L. or Sprague may have been as
class representatives when compared with the other eleven defendants in the
action who could not represent the class in the absence of proper jurisdiction.
DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

The general questions discussed thus far have occasionally, though ambiguously, been addressed as constitutional issues by the Supreme Court.
Thus, a 1938 opinion suggests that in personam jurisdiction must be
established as a matter of fundamental fairness before a class action may proceed. In Christopher v. Brusselback,6s the Court acknowledged that "[t]he
question decisive of the case is whether petitioners are bound by the Illinois
adjudication, in their absence," 64 where the petitioners were class members in
the earlier adjudication but were not served with process. The plaintiff sought
to enforce a previous Illinois judgment against a defendant stockholder class
including Ohio residents. Although the class action aspects of the suit were
obvious, it is not clear whether the Court focused on those questions or on the
corporate-stockholder relationship to evaluate the circumstances under which
65
a shareholder may be bound by a judgment against the corporate entity.
The ultimate conclusion of the Court is nevertheless clear: some "warning"
must be given the shareholder before a decree results in a res judicata ef6
"Id. at 534. The court at this point is discussing the "numerosity" requirement of FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The court's approach to this basic requirement of Rule 23 erroneously concludes
that impossibility of joinder will satisfy the spirit of the (a)(1) subsection, even though it seems
clear in the rule that difficulty of joinder must be a function of numbers, rather than
geographical distribution, for a class action to be appropriate. Compare Coniglio v. Highwood
Serv. Inc., [1973] 1 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 74,314 (W.D. N.Y. 1972) (deciding the issue of class
certification), [1973] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,795 (W.D. N.Y. 1973), affd 495 F.2d 1286 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974). The district court concluded that "although
joinder of all such teams in a single suit may be impractical, that is not a result of numbers."
[1973] 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,314 at 93,460.
6
Nationwide service of process statutes of course present no insurmountable constitutional
barriers, and seem increasingly desirable in complex litigation such as the typical defendant class
action. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1063, at 204 (1969).
The court in Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974), thus concludes that "the 'minimal
contacts' principle does not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based on nationwide . . . service of process." Id. at 1143.
53302 U.S. 500 (1938).
'Id. at 501.
'Id. at 503.
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fect.u To the extent that the Court considered the class action aspects of the
suit, its comments are striking in light of their seeming contradiction of
earlier Court opinions. Thus, the opinion acknowledged that "in a class suit
'one or more may sue or defend for the whole,"' 67 but explicitly held that this
procedure was only "to be followed in cases of the federal courts, and not to
68
enlarge their jurisdiction.
The language of Christopher may be contrasted with earlier Supreme
Court holdings involving both plaintiff and defendant classes. The prior opinion in Smith v. Swormstedt6" was the first determination by the Court that a
defendant class certification may satisfy constitutional standards. The Court
found it was "well established" that such suits may be brought,70 and explained that "[for convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a
court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the
court."'

The sole admonishion was that "care must be taken that persons are

brought on the record fairly representing the interest or right involved, so
that it may be fully and honestly tried." 72 Thus, the Rule 23(a)(4) "adequacy of representation" constraint of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apparently serves as the dominant due process safeguard in the opinion of the
73
Swormstedt court.
"Id. at 504.
6
1d. at 505 (quoting superceded FED. R. EQUITY 38).
: id.
957 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
10Id. at 302.
"Id. at 303.
72Id.
"Adequacy of representation has been held to be an essential element of due process in the
plaintiff class context. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1765,
at 618 (1972). There are obvious difficulties encountered, however, when applying this test to a
defendant class representative chosen by the plaintiff. "It is a strange situation where one side
picks out the generals for the enemy's army." Z. CHAFEE. JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 237
(1950). The test for adquate representation of a defendant class has been termed "similar to that
employed to determine whether a plaintiff will fairly protect the interests of the class members."
7 WRIGHT & MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1770, at 658 (1972). Other commentators have raised special considerations in the case of the defendant class, though not with
agreement. One controversy centers around the relevance of the representative's "desire" or
"motivation" to represent the class. It has been urged that "[t]he representative's personal motivation to be the representative of a class should not play more than a nominal role in a defendant
class action. Otherwise, every possible representative would claim a lack of desire to be the named party." Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action with a Public
Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. L. REv. 357, 380 (1975). The opposite conclusion
is reached in Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigation Patents?"
1971 U. Ill. L. F. 474, where the author determines that "[d]esire to defend should be considered
when the class is the defendant, since a plaintiff could easily name class representatives who
would not defend vigorously." Id. at 483. The disagreement may be more semantic than real,
however, and in part a function of two distinct kinds of defendant class actions. If by desire to
defend one means a desire to be a defendant, then such a test would clearly be meaningless. The
only meaningful concept of a "desire" to represent is that found in the plaintiff class context:
whether a party has a "personal stake" in the outcome. This formulation of the test is inap-
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Another case prior to the Christopher decision, Hartford Life Insurance
Co. v. Ibs, 74 reflects the Court's willingness to carry the principle of Swormstedt to its logical extreme. One Ibs had attempted to recover on a life insurance fund, but was precluded from proving an essential element of her
75
claim because of previous adverse adjudication in a class action suit. Ibs
was a non-participating member of the class. Without reference to jurisdictional issues, the Court pointed to the appropriateness of the class action
treatment given to the earlier suit and relied upon policies of convenience
and uniformity to arrive at this result. The Court emphasized that "[t]o use
the Mortuary Fund in one way for claims of members residing in one State
and to use it another way as to claims of members residing in a different
State" would be destructive of the fund.76 Of course, the same policies of
propriate to some defendant class actions, as where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged
by suit against representative officials. See Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action with a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. L. REV. 357
(1975). In such a situation, it may not be accurate to speak of any official's "stake" in the litigation outcome. But such defendant classes should be distinguished from suits against private interests. See the discussion of Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945), at note
111 infra. In cases such as Kelly it may well be appropriate to require that the "stake" be more
substantial in the case of a defendant class as opposed to a plaintiff class, if one assumes that
liability to a defendant class member is more onerous than a plaintiff's lost day in court.
This argument suggests a different result should possibly have been reached in the Trucking Employers case. Defendant and plaintiff classes are explicitly equated on this issue: "This
court takes the view that fair representation will be assured if the named parties-be they plaintiffs or defendants-share the interests of all class members with respect to the substantive issues
in the suit." United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 687 (D.D.C. 1977).
Defendants pointed to two factors, however, which warranted consideration: First, the fact that
the defendants were competitors may create a dangerous conflict of interest between the class
and its representative. Id. at 688. This factor should call for a restrictive determination of
"representativeness." See Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating
Patents? 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474, 484-85. One at least suspects that the court is being unnecessarily narrow in its determination that "it is well established that only a conflict that goes to the
essential subject matter of the litigation . . . will defeat a claim of representative status," even if
that is the test in plaintiff class actions. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D.
682, 688 (D.D.C. 1977). At the same time, the defendants urged that the representative parties
could not adequately protect the interests of the entire class because they were parties to an
earlier consent decree with the plaintiffs. Id. at 690. The court's conclusion that the parties'
representativeness would not be hampered by the decree raises important questions. While
the court argues that the earlier decree in no way constituted an admission of any illegal practices, and that litigable issues remained with respect to the representatives, it would surely seem
more appropriate that new representatives be named under the circumstances. The case may
create a dangerous precedent that less than adequate representative parties will be tolerated by
courts where it would be jurisdictionally difficult or otherwise inconvenient to name proper
representatives. Moreover, while the court cites several precedents to the effect that a class action
is not mooted where the representative parties have signed a decree [id. at 690 n.4], one must
question its conclusion. Important "case or controversy" questions must arise in an action involving both plaintiff and defendant classes where none of the named parties have a continuing stake
in the litigation.
:4237 U.S. 662 (1915).
5
' Dresser v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 80 Conn. 681, 70 A. 39 (1908).
"6237 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1915). It should be noted that Hartford plaintiff Ibs was not a resident of Connecticut, where the previous class action was conducted. Additionally, the Court at
no point indicates a concern with whether lbs had any notice of the prior class action during the
pendency of that action.
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judicial consistency would also have been relevant in Christopher, and indeed
in any case which satisfied the minimal requirements of Rule 23. Thqse who
find the Christopher conclusion more appropriate may draw support from the
fact that in Hartford, Ibs had received no notice from the representative parties of the previous class adjudication.
The important case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble77 confirmed
the language of Swormstedt and Hartford, and continues to be cited by lower
courts. Unlike Swormstedt, Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur involved only a plaintiff class, though it cited Swormstedt in arriving at the determination that Indiana citizens may be part of the plaintiff class without destroying diversity
jurisdiction because "their rights were duly represented by those before the
court.

7 8s

The policy concerns of Hartford were reiterated:

[I]f the Indiana citizens are not concluded by the decree, and all others in
the class are, this unfortunate situation may result in the determination of
the rights of most of the class by a decree rendered upon a theory which may
be repudiated in another forum as to part of the same class.
If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which
they are obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all the class
properly represented . .

. If the decree is to be effective and conflicting

judgements are to be avoided all of the class must be concluded by the
decree.7 9

The court in Hansberry v. Lee80 alluded to the developing confusion by
noting the general rule that a non-party cannot be bound by an adjudication
includes a class action exception "to an extent not precisely defined by
judicial opinion. '81 Moreover, the Hansberry Court acknowledged that
Christopher represents some limitation to this exception, though it failed to
define it.82 It may be that the Christopher opinion does not require in personam jurisdiction over the entire class. An alternative reading is that if personal jurisdiction is not obtained, absent class members must receive ade77255 U.S. 356 (1921).
78
1d. at 366.
"Id. at 366-7. The Court here, opposed to the Hartford court, does recognize a
jurisdictional question. It disposed of it with the cryptic comment:
The change in Rule 38 by the omission of the qualifying clause is significant. It is
true that jurisdiction, not warranted by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
cannot be conferred by a rule of court, but class suits were known before the adoption
of our judicial system ...
Id. Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938), appears to answer this directly:
Equity Rule 38 . . . was adopted. . . . to prescribe the procedure in equity to be
followed in cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and not to enlarge their
jurisdiction. The omission [also referred to above in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur] . . .
of the phrase ". . . the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all
the absent parties" preserved unimpaired the jurisdiction in federal courts . . . to
render a decree binding upon absent defendants . . . within the jurisdiction of the
court.
Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
80311 U.S. 32 (1940).
lid.
at 41.
2
1d. at 41-43.
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quate notice in addition to adequate representation. The extent of notice and
accompanying "opportunity to be heard" may depend on the facts of the
case. It will be recalled, for example, that the Trucking Employers III court
required that absent class members be notified of the pendency of the action
and that they also be notified of significant developments throughout the
litigation with a corresponding opportunity to appear before the court. In
most instances this would seem to be the minimum required by due process.
Whether fundamental fairness requires as well that.separate counsel be appointed for such absent members, as in Appleton, may depend on the facts in
each case. One can at least offer valid policy reasons for a different treatment
of absent members of plaintiff and defendant classes. Such a distinction
would explain the different results in Christopher as opposed to Hartford and
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, inasmuch as the latter two cases involved plaintiff classes.
Consider the positions of both a plaintiff and defendant class after a
judgment adverse to the class. While one could argue that the liability imposed
upon a nonparticipating defendant class member is no more unfair than
the loss to a plaintiff who may never have his day in court, one may intuit
that the two situations are not precisely identical. Where class action suits involve damage claims, it is likely that the liability of an individual defendant
will be greater than the lost recovery of an individual plaintiff. Stated differently, plaintiff classes are generally larger than defendant classes, a fact
which is neither surprising nor likely to change in light of the fact that collecting judgments from individual defendants may be a time-comsuming
endeavor s and because of the "link" between defendants which must be
shown under Rule 23 before defendants may be sued as a class. 84 A plaintiff
is not likely to be able to show such a connection among a large number of
defendants even assuming he wanted to tackle the difficulties of proceeding
against so large a class. And even where damages are not claimed against a
defendant class, there is an obvious, though perhaps intangible, stigma which
must be borne by an unsuccessful defendant that has no counterpart in the
case of a plaintiff who loses his day in court. Thus, the nonparticipating
defendant may be more in need of judicial protection than is the absent
plaintiff class member.
" 5Even where courts have held that defendant classes may be sued without obtaining personal jurisdiction over all defendants it has been required that plaintiffs obtain a collateral judgment of enforcement by a court which does have in personam jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the
person is a necessity for exercise of the various forms of judicial coercion. See Note, Damage in
Class Actions: Determination and Allocation, 10 B. C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 615, 619-21
(1969).84
Courts have generally required that there be some "juridical link" or concerted action
among the defendants. See, e.g., LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463-4
(9th Cir. 1973); Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1238 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Manning v.
Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1975); and Mudd v. Busse,
68 F.R.D. 522, 527-29 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
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Subsequent conclusions of courts and commentators have undermined a
literal interpretation of Christopher which would require jurisdiction over all
defendants. An example is Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen,85 a labor discrimination case involving a black railroad
worker who attempted to sue the railroad and a labor union. A major
obstacle faced by the plaintiff was obtaining jurisdiction over the union
association. While service was possible on the local brotherhood, it clearly was
impractical with respect to the entire association, which encompassed
numerous federal jurisdictions throughout the nation. The court allowed the
suit, which involved a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief and
monetary damages, with the explanation that
It cannot be contended with any show of reason that Munden and the subordinate lodge, who were admittedly served, were not fairly representative of
the membership of the brotherhood, or that service upon them would not
give adequate notice to the class sued to come in and defend ....
[W]e think that the suit here was unquestionably maintainable as a class
unit and that there has been sufficient service upon representative members
to give jurisdiction over the entire class constituting the brotherhood.8 6
While the argument would not reconcile Christopher and a case such as
Tunstall, it may be possible to argue that Christopher requires jurisdiction
over all defendants where damages are sought, since it is in such cases that
the absent defendant is most likely to be prejudiced vis-a-vis his plaintiff class
counterpart. At least one commentator has urged that defendant class
members subjected to damage claims "may be able to raise serious constitutional objections if, because of the class action device, they are forced to defend in a forum where they have no personal contacts. '87 Such an argument
may draw support from Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 88
where the court certified the defendant class under the (b)(3) subsection of
Rule 23 with respect to the antitrust damage claim. 89 The notable
characteristics of that subsection of the rule are that notice must be given to
all class members and they may "opt out" of the litigation if they choose. 0
However, such an approach is neither typical, nor, it may be argued, practicable, Courts have certified defendant classes under the less restrictive (b)(1)
and (b)(2) subsections of Rule 23 where a damage claim was contained within
the remedies sought, 9' among them the court in Trucking Employers.
8148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945).
"Id. at 406.
01 NEWBERG ON CLAss AcTioNs § 1148c, at 256 (1977).
"1301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"Id, at 502-04.

"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides for notice of the class action: "[T]he court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable .... The notice shall advise each member
that (a) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date ..
"
"See, e.g., Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 500
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (patent infringement claims); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode
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Moreover, as that court recognized, the opt-out provision of Rule 23 (b)(3)
may bring an untimely end to the litigation:
Defendants, unlike plaintiffs, are ordinarily involuntary participants in a law
suit. To provide them the wherewithal to frustrate a suit that is properly certifiable as a class action simply by refusing to participate in it-by opting-out would be anomalous . . . Hence, once a court has determined
that an action such as this one is fair to the defendant class, manageable,
and otherwise proper
under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) may be the only practical cer92
tification available.
Still another commentator has suggested that special considerations may
apply where injunctive, rather than declaratory, relief is sought from a defendant class. 93 Professor Moore relies upon United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C.,
Inc.9 4 to conclude that such a situation requires that jurisdiction may be
necessary with respect to all members of a defendant class. While the holding
of that case seems to support his contention,9" the real concern of that opinion may be with the appropriateness of the class action device itself, rather
than the nature of the remedy sought. After determining at one point that
jurisdictional requirements are especially important where injunctive relief is
sought,96 the court ultimately narrows its decision: "[I]t is true . . . that injunctive relief can be afforded against defendants who are members of a
class, [but] the suit now under consideration involves not only injunctive relief
but also the varying terms of some 70 different contracts with the local
unions."97 In any event, the possibly broad holding of this case does not rest
on any clear policy basis, and has not been reiterated in other opinions.
The Pfister court appears to have been headed in a generally correct
direction when it required certification under Rule 23(b)(3), since that course
would at least insure notice to absent defendant class members. Notice, as
well as being fundamental to most notions of fairness, is central to any effiElecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398,

(W.D. Mich. 1976), the court determined that damages should be ascertained through individual
negotiations or by a special master, and hence would not bar certification under (b)(2). Id. at 411.
9
United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D.D.C. 1977). See also
693, n.8, where the opinion states that "The court questions the wisdom of permitting defendants
to opt out of a suit that is properly certifiable as a defendant class action." On the other hand, a
considerable number of defendant classes have been certified under the (b)(3) subsection of Rule 23,
apparently without consideration of the anomalies. See, e.g., Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F. Supp. 103,
105-06 (E.D. Va. 1976); Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1388
(E.D. Va. 1974); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp., 57 F.R.D, 177, 180 (N.D. Ga.
1972); and Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp., 714,
724-25 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
99
See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.40, at 103 (Supp. 1977-78).
94335 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
""The matters to be decided in this case require that the deciding court have in personam
jurisdiction and that the defendants be personally before the court." Id. at 248.
96
Id.
97
1d.
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cient administration of controversies and is one of the fundamental purposes
of service of process. Again, however, the precedents are unclear. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 98 is a leading Supreme Court case which
ties notice to due process considerations. Though not technically a class action dispute, the case shares many elements with the typical class action to
the extent it concerns itself with "the constitutional sufficiency of notice to
beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common
trust fund." 99 The Court held that in these circumstances, constructive notice
by publication was inadequate.100 In contrast to Mullane, class action decisions have frequently sought to avoid any rigid requirement of notice, with
some going so far as to suggest that it is unnecessary in the case of absent
class members. 0 1 This conclusion is implied in many class actions by the
absence of any discussion of notice. 0 2 A middle position tends to require sufficient notice to insure adequate representation, though as a practical matter
this may be a difficult standard to apply. Tunstall, for example, found that
service upon a local representative would give adequate notice to the class.' 03
By a similar line of reasoning, a court has held in a plaintiff class action that
sufficient notice may in certain circumstances constitute a waiver of any ob04
jections to adequacy of representation by the representative party.'
The famous plaintiff class action case, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,105
suggests that notice is crucial to due process, but avoids so holding. While the
Court finds "little to commend" the prevailing argument that adequacy of
representation, rather than notice, is the "touchstone of due process,"'' 06 the
holding of the case does not impose a constitutional requirement of notice,
08339

U.S. 306 (1950).

"Id. at 307.
'"Id. at 314.
"'Northern Natural Gas. Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, (D. Kan. 1968) explicitly
stated that "the essential requisite of due process as to absent members of the class is not notice,
but the adequacy of representation of their interests by named parties." Id. at 636. The case
relied on Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), which suggested that "[T]here has been failure
of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties .. " Id. at 42.
"'See, e.g., Management Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162
(E.D. Pa. 1971), where it was held that "Where a class
is adequately represented, and where
there is no conflict of interest between members of a class, a judgment binding on all the
members does not offend due process." Id. at 165. See also the discussions of Sworrmtedt and
Hartford Lie, supra.
1'148 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1945).
1"'In In Re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974), the court
held that where a class member has the right to opt out, receives adequate notice, and fails to do
so, "we conclude that due process may be satisfied by notice alone and that, where due process is
thus satisfied, adequacy of representation need not be shown as a matter of constitutional
necessity." Id. at 843.
105417 U.S. 156 (1974).
"01"Petitioner further contends that adequate representation, rather than notice, is the
touchstone of due process in a class action and therefore satisfies Rule 23. We think this view has
little to commend it." Id. at 176.
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but instead relies upon the ground that Rule 23 was not satisfied because the
Rule 23(c)(2) provision requires notice in all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. 107
The Federal Courts of Appeals are split on whether due process requires
notice in all class actions. A majority hold that is does not.

08

The courts

which have confronted the issue have seldom had occasion, however, to consider whether the rule should be different for plaintiff and defendant classes.
Such a distinction may be appropriate; to the extent that service of process
and venue requirements may defeat the utility of defendant classes and produce anomalous results, it may be that other protections, such as notice,
should be required. Those courts which urge that "adequacy of representation" satisfies due process concerns may be taking a somewhat backward approach to the problem, since a principal reason for requiring an adequate
representative is to insure that he will notify the class members.109 In the case
of the defendant class, at least, there seems no reason to extract double service from this Rule 23(a)(4) requirement, since it is unlikely that the costs of
notice will be prohibitive in light of the fact that defendant classes are
generally not so large as plaintiff classes."10 Moreover, as the Trucking
Employers court recognized, adequacy of representation is not a static concept which a court may easily determine. Notice to all defendants in a defendant class action and other safeguards extending so far as separate counsel
may well be necessary to insure continuous adequacy of representation. It
seems intuitively clear that a requirement of notice to all defendants would be
less open to abuse than the looser notion of adequacy of representation."'
Moreover, it is consistent with notions of fundamental fairness, as recognized
by the Eisen court, to require that the safeguard be expressed as one of
07

' "[Q]uite apart from what due process may require, the command of Rule 23 is clearly to

the contrary ....

[R]ule 23(c)(2) requires that individual notice be sent to all class members...

. 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). It should be noted that (c)(2) refers only to (b)(3) actions; (d)(2),

which formulates a looser, and less clear, discretionary standard, is the only other rule requirement pertaining to notice, and it applies to all categories of class actsons.

108See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Ryan v. Shea, 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975); Hammon v. Powell, 462
F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); and Johnsons v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th

Cir. 1959). But see Schraeder v. Selective Serv. Sys., 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S.
1085 (1972); and Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
59
" See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1770, at 659 (1972),

where it is urged that "One very important factor that arises in actions involving defendant
classes is whether the chosen representatives are people who will notify the class of the pendency
of the action so that the collective resources of the group may be used to defend the action."
-It seems equitable that these costs should be borne by the plaintiff in the case of a defendant class in accordance with the general rationale outlined by the Supreme Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle &Jacquelin:"Where, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the
plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit."
417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974).
"'One suspects that a requirement of notice to all class members would have prevented the
unjust result in the case of Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 8 (1945). As noted in
7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1770 (1972), the case involved

an instance where "the whole class was held bound by an action against carefully picked class
representatives with a very small financial interest who made only a token defense." Id. at 659
n.41.

1978]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

notice; to suggest that a court may exert its coercive power without either
warning or corresponding opportunity for objection appears alien to any concept of due process, whatever the adequacy of representation involved.
CONCLUSION

This discussion has outlined the dispute over application of personal
jurisdiction requirements in defendant class actions. It has been suggested
that imposing either service of process or venue requirements with respect to
the entire class would debilitate the class action to no apparent purpose. The
inherent anomalies of these requirements, as applied to defendant classes,
have been noted; stringent limitations on jurisdiction could mean that a
plaintiff could select an incompetent representative for the defendant class or
re-define the class for his own purposes. Such requirements would be impractical even where they could be met, due to the difficulties and expense of serving all of the class members. The same problems would arise in a considerable number of cases if jurisdiction over all defendants were required
where damages or injunctive relief are sought.112 To the extent that courts
and commentators have only indirectly approached the notice question by requiring that such actions be brought under the (b)(3) subsection of Rule 23,
their result is undesirable. The "opt-out" provision of that subsection would
largely render the suit futile. At the same time, it is similarly inappropriate to
approach the problem simply as one of "adequacy of representation." A requirement of notice which may be expanded to continous notice throughout
the course of the litigation as circumstances demand would seem to be more
flexible and less open to abuse. If the impetus for requiring notice is that it
derives from fundamental notions of fairness, it is appropriate that the rule
be expressed as a constitutional one. Thus, the conclusion reached here may
encompass the remaining meaning of the seemingly-forgotten Christopher
decision, which apparently required that jurisdiction be met with respect to
all defendants. The Court's pronouncement in that case was that a corporation will be allowed 3to enter a judgment upon its stockholders only if some
"warning" is given." A "reckonable" interpretation of the case may be that
for defendant class actions notice to all class members is a substitute for the
protective procedural measures contained within personal jurisdiction. A narrower reading of the case and the policies with which it is concerned may
defeat a time-saving device whose utility is just being realized; to abandon the
cautions of Christopher altogether may unnecessarily increase the complexities
and the occasional opportunism found in the already-troublesome class action
conflict.
FREDERICK

B.

KRUGER

JOHN M. ROGERS

"'The major category of defendant class actions where neither of these remedies are pursued are those cases in which declaratory relief is sought with respect to a defendant class. Most
of these cases involve challenges to statutes in which public officials comprise the defendant class.
"'Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 504 (1938).

